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In conversation with Georges Duthuit, Samuel Beckett famously remarked, “there is 
nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no 
power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express.”1 Over the 
years, this statement has been read in numerous ways, and it is arguable that it has fre-
quently been overread as an aesthetic manifesto that casts interpretative light on Beck-
ett’s project as a whole. Irrespective of the complexities or problems that underpin such 
an overdetermined reading, however, what is particularly interesting about this state-
ment for my purposes here is simply that for Beckett, language in its common form—
language as we know it and use it on a daily basis—is not fit for purpose. In the famous 
“German letter of 1937,” Beckett writes that language is increasingly “a veil which one 
has to tear apart in order to get to those things (or the nothingness) lying behind.” And as 
Beckett continues in the same letter, his task is to experiment with “grammar and style” 
in order that he might “drill one hole after another into [language] until that which lurks 
behind, be it something or nothing, starts seeping through—I cannot,” Beckett adds, 
“imagine a higher goal for today’s writer.”2
———
In Immemorial Silence Karmen MacKendrick notes how “the concern with the limits of 
language is a tradition with multiple roots: we find it in ancient mysticism as the ‘inef-
fable,’ in negative theology as the unnamable, in the Nietzschean warning that grammar 
seduces us into a belief in metaphysics, even in the Wittgensteinian warning that philos-
ophy, being all language games, must not infrequently remain silent.”3 Indeed, as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein famously cautioned in the seventh section of the Tractatus, “whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”4 Yet it might also be well to remember Mau-
rice Blanchot’s rejoinder, “to be silent is still to speak. Silence is impossible.”5
 The problem of how to respond to this conundrum might be said to be one of the most 
fundamental formal problems at the heart of much twentieth-century and early twenty-
first-century avant-garde literary practice.
———
With reference to Beckett’s notebooks and letters, it has been relatively well documented 
that one of Beckett’s primary sources for the sense of ignorance at play in his works 
stems from his reading, in 1936, of work of the seventeenth-century Flemish metaphysi-
cian and mathematician, Arnold Geulincx.6 One of the central elements of Geulincx’s 
thinking that interested Beckett was his consideration of the limits of empiricism. While 
Geulincx argued that “everything seeks to be known: not to have been known is almost 
not to have been born” (nosci omnes appetunt: non notum fuisse, ferme est non natum 
fuisse), he also maintained that each and every empirical explanation is undone by 
the parameters of its own definition.7 “Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis,” Geulincx stated, 
“Wherein you have no power, therein you should not will.”8 “Yes, let’s go. They do not 
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move” as the famous final line and stage direction from Waiting for Godot have it; Vladi-
mir and Estragon seek momentum but are riveted by their lack of power. According to 
Geulincx’s Metaphysica, “motion thus has two parts, from being and to being” (motus 
enim duas habet partes: abesse et adesse).9 If only they could give themselves to the pas-
sivity of waiting, in which one simply waits, rather than waits for something. It is the 
giving up, or over, of self that was most particularly expressed in Geulincx’s writing by 
the analysis of the term humilitas. “I am a mere spectator of this machine, whose work-
ings I can neither adjust nor readjust; wherein I neither devise nor destroy anything: the 
whole thing is someone else’s affair.”10 Humilitas connotes the renunciation of will, the 
abandonment of both claims to power and knowledge. It is, in other words, the principle 
at the heart of both Geulincx’s and Beckett’s thinking that comes to be expressed in con-
densed form by the maxim nescio, “I don’t know.”
 
———
Broadly outlined, near the end of Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, in “Skepti-
cism and Reason,” Emmanuel Levinas’s main concern is to propose a form of argument 
that takes place as the cancellation of its own expression. For Levinas, the skeptical the-
sis emblematizes this cancellation succinctly. The reason for this is twofold. On the one 
hand, Levinas argues that skepticism prohibits comprehension because the equivoca-
tion it names necessarily puts all deductive reasoning into question. Skepticism, in other 
words, indicates the non-productive spacing of an ambivalent interval that prevents any 
correlation of thesis to synthesis, irregularity to equivalence. In Levinas’s terms: “skepti-
cism, which traverses the rationality or logic of knowledge, is a refusal to synchronize 
the implicit affirmation contained in saying and the negation which this affirmation 
states in the said.”11 On the other hand, the refutation skepticism specifies does not pro-
duce a counter-knowledge, which is to say, it does not produce a veritas of refutation. 
For Levinas, the exemplarity of skepticism consists precisely in the fact that skepticism 
also refutes the presentation of its own argument. The critical point here, then, is that 
Levinas points to the manner in which the structure of skepticism is irreducibly double: 
skepticism is always and already also the refutation of skepticism. Rather than deny-
ing the possibility of a skeptical discourse, however, the self-contradiction of skepticism 
is precisely that which returns the cautionary register of skepticism to discourse as an 
“invincible force.”12 “Skepticism is refutable,” Levinas writes, “but it returns.”13 It returns 
as the dis-course of discourse, a discourse, in other words, that is periodic in the double 
sense of that which is both “without end and without continuity.”14
 Levinas goes on to claim that the discourse of skepticism points to a language that 
would “exceed the limits of what is thought, by suggesting, letting be understood with-
out ever making understandable, an implication of a meaning distinct from that which 
comes to signs from the simultaneity of systems or the logical definition of concepts.”15 
In so doing, skepticism opens toward a thought of language indivisible from its crossings 
and traversal. Skepticism requires that language be counter-positional, that it proceed 
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in fits and starts, with questions and effacements, in a manner always turning, that is 
always wandering against the limit of what it has not been quite possible to say, always 
forming, always falling.
———
In an interview with Israel Shenker in 1956 Beckett implicitly recalls the importance of 
admitting the limits of knowledge when reflecting on the task of the writer.16 For Beck-
ett, that is, to write is first and foremost an exercise in impotence and ignorance. In Beck-
ett studies this rhetoric of ignorance or impotence more often than not tends to be read 
in the context of Beckett’s reading, in the 1920s and 1930s, of Geulincx, Giordano Bruno, 
and George Berkeley, and particularly in relation to the latter’s opinion that objects of 
sense perception have no existence outside the mind that perceives them (as expressed, 
in shorthand, by his famous dictum so central to Beckett’s work, esse est percipi). More 
to the point, such “ignorance” or “impotence” is most frequently understood as being 
directly continuous with Beckett’s avowed aim to excavate the something or nothing of 
language and which has been referred to variously by critics as indicative of Beckett’s 
poetics of “unknowing,” “ignorance,” and “residua,” as well as an intersected “poetics of 
exhaustion and a poetics of persistence,” but which just as equally might be thought of 
as a “poetics of particles.”17
 For Beckett, though, the problem is that such “ignorance”—language’s something or 
nothing—is practically impossible to achieve. It is, that is to say, impossible to achieve in 
practice. For the writer in particular, that is to say, language is never still, never stalled: 
still here, still stilling, still going on. The measure of a text is the distance its language 
keeps, like a still image, stilling what looks, as the body is at once both fragile and impen-
etrable, but there is always, always already, a word too many and any line of observation 
is unavoidably unbalanced by interference. Thus the methodological question of how 
best to drill into language to bring about this exposure becomes both the cornerstone 
and the first principle of the writer’s motivation and practice.
———
Stephen Barker: “In Nietzsche, this Dionysian threat becomes a transgressive practice, in 
which fragmentary style is part of an effort to ‘atomize’ poetic discourse and philosophy, 
to ‘return’ it to its basic semantic and grammatical ingredients. Only interpolations of 
sense emanate from the noli me legere of Nietzsche’s fragmentary logic, marking a porten-
tous opening from and to a void. . . . His aphoristic and fragmentary works are themselves, 
as he calls them in The Gay Science, Freigeisterei, ‘free-spirit works,’ thus marking their 
extra-moral sense and their play on (and away from) the surface. In this transgressive 
(non-) designation in which the aphorism, or the fragment, is to be seen as the free spirit, 
at the same time one must remember that the Freigeisterei, in their flight from reason and 
the Law, must accept in that flight the slippage that makes them vogelfrei, ‘free-birds.’”
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 As Barker continues: “Thus the outcome of Nietzsche’s strategic fragmentation is a 
radical atomism insisting that we ‘cannot legitimately group together individual momen-
tary experiences or sensations’ (McGowan) but then do just that, precisely to show that 
the ‘legitimation’ of such a grouping is always its illegitimacy, its danger, the manifesta-
tion of die Triebe, the ‘drives’ (Nietzsche’s word, not yet Freud’s) both within and (not) 
beyond writing. This atomism is echoed in the elementalistic language strategies of 
Blanchot and Beckett, in which the most fundamental elements are examined for inclu-
sion and rejection.”18
———
The nuclear physicist David Bohm once remarked how “revolutionary changes in phys-
ics have always involved the perception of new order and attention to the development of 
new ways of using language that are appropriate to the communication of such order.”19 
Similarly, Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, first published in 1927, states that 
it is not possible to know the exact position and motion of something at the same time. 
For Heisenberg, the subatomic world of quantum mechanics goes against the grain of 
common sense. Throwing into question classical concepts such as mass, location, and 
velocity, it demands a departure from the standard language and imagery of physics. 
Thus Heisenberg argued that events in space-time in the subatomic level could not be 
conveyed in ordinary language or imagery because their effects are not perceived by our 
senses. Crucially, for Heisenberg uncertainty is not to be understood so much as an epis-
temic lack but rather as a deficiency in scientific description:
The point is we are bound up with a language, we are hanging in the language. If we want 
to do physics, we must describe our experiments and the results to other physicists, so that 
they can be verified or checked by others. At the same time, we know that the words we use 
to describe the experiments have only a limited range of applicability. That is a fundamental 
paradox, which we have to confront. We cannot avoid it; we have simply to cope with it, to 
find what is the best thing we can do about it.20 
 “The syndrome known as life,” Beckett writes in Murphy, “is too diffuse to admit of 
palliation. For every symptom that is eased, another is made worse. The horse leech’s 
daughter is a closed system. Her quantum of wantum cannot vary.”21 As such, “a certain 
lack of clarity is inevitable,” writes Andrew Keen. The recourse to the loose, “flimsy” lan-
guage of analogy is the only means of non-mathematical expression available to explain 
the intricacies of quantum theory, and it is never more than approximation.”22
———
Jean-Luc Nancy’s essay “Elliptical Sense” is concerned with thinking through some of 
the implications of Jacques Derrida’s notion of différance. In that essay, Nancy refers to 
what he terms a “lightening of meaning” which, he says, refers to the “knowledge of a 
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condition of possibility that gives nothing to know.”23 It gives nothing to know, Nancy 
continues, because it “‘signals’ there where there no longer is any sign—save the repeti-
tion of the demand, from sign to sign, towards the limit where existence is exposed.”24 
Here the “lightening of meaning” refers to that point or situation at which all language 
and all weighing break down or fracture. The lightening of meaning is that point at 
which language becomes dislocated, displaced, disarticulated, when the transparency of 
sense becomes an impenetrable depth. It is, Nancy says, “the lightening of every system 
and every cycle.”25 It is the density of a writing of edges, sliding, in-significant. Nancy 
exemplifies what is at stake here: 
Meaning needs a thickness, a density, a mass, and thus an opacity, a darkness by means of 
which it leaves itself open and lets itself be touched as meaning right there where it becomes 
absent as discourse. . . . This “there” is a material point, a weighty point: the flesh of a lip, the 
point of a pen or of a stylus, any writing insofar as it traces out the interior and exterior edges 
of language. It is the point where all writing is ex-scribed, where it comes to rest outside of 
the meaning it inscribes, in the things whose inscription this meaning is supposed to form.26
The question of writing, Nancy remarks, is “the question of the letter of meaning and of 
the meaning of the letter.”27 In order to measure this question, it is necessary to read not 
meaning but what spaces meaning. François Raffoul clarifies this, remarking how “this 
is what ultimately weighs: the fact of being exposed to what thought receives, to what 
remains inappropriable for it.”28
———
It is fair to say that not much happens in Beckett’s 1972 text “Still.” But then again, it 
would also be fair to say that too much happens still. The opening of “Still” specifies that 
a body sits bolt upright in a chair, looks out of a window, and watches the sun set. It is 
“quite dark,” “quite quiet,” “quite still.” Yet it is also, therefore, not dark, not quiet, not 
still; or, perhaps better, it is not quite dark, quiet, or still enough: neither this nor that but 
hesitant, uncertain, something among other things, still life, or life still, as in the persis-
tence of the body, despite itself, “trembling all over.”29
 Stillness is difficult to achieve. Faced with this difficulty, “Still” turns around half-
formed questions of vision, notation, movement, and space, taken frame by frame, still by 
still, the anonymous anatomy of no one the textual pivot point:
Here because of what comes now not midway to the head but almost there before it hesi-
tates and hangs there trembling as if half inclined etc. Half no but on the verge when in its 
turn the head moves from its place forward and down among the ready fingers where no 
sooner received and held it weighs on down till elbow meeting armrest brings this last move-
ment to an end and all still once more.30
Here, in the space of this indifferent room, in the angle of this anonymous, depersonal-
ized body, Beckett’s “Still” plays on a four-fold sense of that word, suggesting at one time 
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or another “not moving,” “a state of calm,” “being stuck or remaining,” as well as “snap-
shot.” Still, and there everything breaks through and stays still. As in the words of Blan-
chot: “A hand outstretched, refused, which in whatever manner we would not be able to 
grasp.”31 But which also, on the other hand, rivets attention and holds it still. 
 Enoch Brater notes how “the word still itself, like the hours of a day, is sounded 
twenty-four times, a verbal journey in disorientating repetition that highlights inversion, 
opposition, and indeterminacy rather than stasis or immobility.”32 There is an interesting 
and implicit return in Beckett here to the Geulincxian doctrines of movement, but one 
in which again, the mind-body is essentially outside itself as in the phrase: “I am there-
fore a mere spectator of this machine. . . . Everything is the work of someone else,” or as 
Geulincx puts it in the dictum, “Ego non facio id, quod quomodo fiat nescio” (I do not 
do that which I do not know how to do).33 In “Still” the arm moves but it is unclear how 
or why it does so, and then “all is still once more.” Throughout “Still” the limited range 
of vocabulary seeks to render physical stillness linguistically. It seeks to halt the forward 
momentum, or sequential drive of language, narrative, and experience. Via Beckett’s 
“syntax of weakness” the intonation of “still” corresponds to a double movement, an 
oscillating movement back and forth between here and there, trembling and still, unrav-
eling, receding, starting over. As the voice of Imagination Dead Imagine puts it, “there 
is nothing elsewhere” such that everything comes back to what takes place here, what 
doesn’t take place, in the space of a room, in the movements of a body, stripped back but a 
kind of life all the same, a portrait of trembling, laid out into angles of composition, light 
and dark, the contours of still life.34 In Texts for Nothing Beckett puts it in the following 
terms: “nothing ever as much as begun, nothing ever but nothing and never, nothing ever 
but lifeless words.”35
———
In 1783 the English natural philosopher John Michell wrote a letter to Henry Cavendish, 
in which he set out the expected properties of what he termed “dark stars.”36 Michell cal-
culated that when the escape velocity at the surface of a star was equal to or greater than 
the speed of light, the generated light would be gravitationally trapped, so that the star 
would not itself be directly visible. “Escape velocity” is the speed needed for an object 
to “break free” from a gravitational field without further propulsion. Black stars, like the 
black holes they prefigure, can be understood as sites of silence, places where language 
fails or, perhaps more properly, “breaks free.” Likewise, in general relativity, an event 
horizon is the boundary beyond which no event can be observed. It doesn’t matter how 
long one gives it because there will never be enough time for light to travel such distance.
———
Since Beckett’s donation in 1988 to James Knowlson of the so-called Whoroscope Note-
book, with its seven and a half pages of notes on modern physics largely drawn from 
Against Metaphor >> Nikolai Duffy 43
Henri Poincaré’s La valeur de la science (1905), interest in Beckett’s engagement with the 
new physics has been steadily growing and a number of studies have emerged over the 
last twenty or so years exploring this area of Beckett’s writing. The large majority of these 
studies, though, have tended to work at the level of content rather than form, identify-
ing direct or allusive references to modern physics in a number of Beckett’s works. To a 
large extent, both Beckett’s texts in general and the Whoroscope Notebook in particular 
encourage these kinds of outline interpretive approaches: the Poincaré notes are labeled 
by Beckett “FOR INTERPOLATION,” which is to say, they are notes to be included, in 
various guises, in his own writing.
 One of the most sustained general commentaries on Beckett’s consideration of devel-
opments in physics is Angela Montgomery’s “Beckett and Science: Watt and the Quan-
tum Universe.” While Montgomery’s primary concern in this essay is with develop-
ing a detailed reading of the importance of references or allusions to the new physics 
in Watt, after an initial overview of the contents of Beckett’s notes on physics in the 
Whoroscope Notebook, Montgomery also makes the interestingly astute observation 
that Beckett’s first written reference to the atomic world predates the notes drawn from 
Poincaré by at least three years. Montgomery remarks that in the 1932 manuscript of 
A Dream of Fair to Middling Women, “the model of the atom recurs as a direct parallel 
to the creative process. . . . This model of the atom gives the idea of the fundamental 
building-blocks of matter being composed of an explosive energy; the sense of a cen-
tre which holds together with the greatest of difficulty.”37 Similarly, in Beckett before 
Godot John Pilling reads Beckett’s interest in quantum physics, wave theory, and par-
ticle theory as the direct reason for The Calmative’s non-dualist “refusal to distinguish 
between one domain and another.”38 Likewise, Daniel Albright somewhat hesitantly sug-
gests that Beckett’s conception of stage time derives, at least in part, from his reading of 
modern physics: 
In Happy Days the ideas of modern physics are felt (perhaps) in the warps of time and space. 
When a character bleeds out into the space that she occupies; when parasols and bottles 
elongate on one axis and shrink on another; when one frame of reference exhibits extreme 
discontinuity with another; when time seems to slow down, almost to stop; when mass seems 
to increase to the point of immobility; then the Lorentz transforms and Einstein’s relativity 
seem to be close at hand.39 
Finally, although writing before the donation of the Whoroscope Notebook, Sylvie 
Debevec Henning provides an astute reading of The Lost Ones in relation to notions of 
teleological self-legitimation, entropic stasis, and the second law of thermodynamics.40
 Needless to say, this is only a cursory overview of what constitutes a growing body of 
critical literature on the subject Beckett and science; no doubt the publication of Chris 
Ackerley’s monograph Samuel Beckett and Science will contribute even further to this 
emergent field of Beckett studies. My main point here, though, is simply that a recon-
sideration of Beckett’s creative response to developments in modern physics provides 
one very specific ground for understanding the particular development and underlying 
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trajectory of Beckett’s poetics: the way he wrote and why he chose to write quite like 
that. In many of the early works, Beckett’s interest in the implications of quantum phys-
ics largely emerges as plot device. Belacqua experiences the “dark gulf,” Murphy’s mind 
is a “tumult of non-Newtonian commotion,” and so on.41 In Murphy the possibility of 
a transcendental system is constantly rejected, most frequently via irony. Arguably one 
of the greatest ironies in the novel is when Murphy idealizes the inmates of the Magda-
len Mental Mercyseat asylum as exemplary of Geulincx’s sense of self-abnegation (ubi 
nihil vales, ibi nihil velis) and yet disregards or does not register “frequent expressions 
apparently of pain, rage, despair and in fact all the usual.”42 Paul Davies notes that “the 
ironic poise . . . is so finely maintained that all the statements fall just short of assent.”43 
Or as Beckett puts it in a conversation with Charles Juliet, “Negation is no more possible 
than affirmation. It is absurd to say that something is absurd. That’s still a value judg-
ment. It is impossible to protest, and equally impossible to assent.”44 As Beckett put it in 
the much earlier essay, “Dante . . . Bruno . Vico . . Joyce,” “the danger is in the neatness 
of identifications.”45 
 For all Beckett’s early reading into the history of philosophy and science, however, 
together with the various expressions of atomism from the very beginning of his career, 
it is not until later, and particularly starting from The Unnamable, that the interest in 
physics starts to shape the method of Beckett’s writing. The prose changes. “The thing 
to avoid,” comments the narrator at the start of The Unnamable, “I don’t know why, is 
the spirit of system. People with things, people without things, things without people, 
what does it matter, I flatter myself it will not take me long to scatter them, whenever I 
choose, to the winds. I don’t see how.”46 Things proceed in fits and starts, with assertions, 
equivocations, falterings, and necessarily so. Every statement is an exercise in both folly 
and irony. “The fact would seem to be, if in my situation one may speak of facts, not only 
that I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak, but also, which is even more 
interesting, but also that I, which is if possible even more interesting, that I shall have to, 
I forget, no matter.”47
 Much of Beckett’s subsequent career can be read as a sustained engagement with the 
practical problem of how to stage the “mess” in language. In other words, it concerned 
an ongoing attempt to find a method of writing that turned “mess” into structural prin-
ciple. Such an understanding of the influence of physics on the development of Beckett’s 
writing practices opens up interesting ways for thinking about new and innovative meth-
ods of writing that both reflect and structurally incorporate some of the central ideas 
that define the contemporary period. What I would like to suggest is that, like Beckett’s 
texts—in particular the late prose works but also more broadly across all his writings—in 
its language, imagery, syntax, and structure, quantum physics trembles precariously at 
the edge of life, an interplay of falling and forming, and as such functions as both critical 
context and corollary for approaching Beckett’s late writings and experimental poetics 
more generally. As Keen illustratively notes: 
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This is partially because the emergence of the scientific mode of thought (both in Beckett’s 
writing and in a wider metaphysical sense) is so closely tied to the existence of the ostensibly 
subjective and non-rational operation of the creative imagination, as well as the development 
of mystical thought patterns (as discussed above). Although Beckett approaches these con-
flicting terms in a manner which is often parodic, and sometimes verging on caricature, he 
never loses sight of their fundamental role in the history and development of human thought. 
Furthermore, the methodological equivalence of opposites that this aspect of his work dem-
onstrates is indicative of an assertion of the necessary co-existence of contrary, though not 
necessarily contradictory, elements in any system.48
———
In his 1721 essay, “De Motu,” (“An Essay on Motion”) George Berkeley claimed that “the 
physicist studies the series or successions of sensible things, noting by what laws they 
are connected, and in what order, what precedes as cause, and what follows as effect.”49 
Throughout that essay, Berkeley contends that notions of absolute space and time are, 
in themselves, without meaning. For Berkeley only sense experience may underwrite 
meaning. Since neither space nor time has any foundation in sense experience, Berkeley 
argues, there is no reason to accept them as meaningful words. All empirical significa-
tion, rather, is entirely conditional on effects.50 Writing nearly two hundred years later, 
Ernst Mach remarked how “the intuition of space is bound up with the organization 
of the senses.” “We are not justified,” Mach goes on, “in ascribing spatial properties to 
things which are not perceived by the senses.”51 Similarly, theories of metric expansion 
suggest that the opening out of the universe is intrinsic: it is defined, simply, as the rela-
tive separation of its own parts rather than any motion outward into something else. It 
is also possible for a distance to exceed the speed of light multiplied by the age of the 
universe, which means that light from one part of space might still be arriving at distant 
locations. As the universe expands and the scale of what is observable contracts, the 
distance to the edge of what can be seen gets closer and closer. While this may sound 
potentially instructive, when the edge of what is observable becomes smaller than a 
body, gravitation is unbound and falling away becomes scattering. All this said, however, 
and where, for instance, various critical responses have read this trajectory in Beckett as 
indicative of a narrative that provides “the tools to implement its abolition,”52 it is worth 
stating that there is no absolute necessity to correlate empirical limits and unknowabil-
ity with narrative futility or possibility, or even generative possibility as, arguably, they 
most frequently are in Beckett studies, but rather as potentially something less loaded, 
less essentially meaningful, more matter of fact, just “how it is,” or at the very least, just 
how it feels to be.
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———
“Enough still not to know. Not to know what they say. Not to know what it is the words 
it says say. Says? Secretes. Say better worse secretes. What it is the words it secretes say. 
What the so-said void. The so-said dim. The so-said shades. The so-said seat and germ 
of all. Enough to know no knowing. No knowing what it is the words it secretes say. No 
saying. No saying what it all is they somehow say.”53
———
Discussing the possibilities for a kind of distant or hands-off collaboration, the Ameri-
can composer Morton Feldman said to Beckett that he was after something that just 
hovered. In its shifts and turns, the resultant text, “neither,” performs a kind of hovering 
that resists comprehension, even, to some extent, commentary. In its folds and fissures, 
the text is a turning away, a never quite getting there, to such an extent that “neither” 
calls for a reading that doubles back or that stills itself. In Beckett’s text, language slips; 
it screens a spacing of movement that excepts identity, that turns inside out the common 
structures of reference and designation. In its elision, “neither” gives rise only to the 
non-voice of the neuter, what Levinas describes as “this Excluded Middle” that is “nei-
ther affirmation nor pure negation” but rather corresponds to a language that hesitates, 
that is “at once affirmative and negative.”54
 What is at stake is a form of language and identity that indicates itself in the event of 
its own rupture: “neither” produces only the errancy of misidentification and mispro-
nunciation, the word that sticks in the mouth’s cavity. At the same time, however, the 
concern of “neither” is a concern for what remains when each and every form of sover-
eignty collapses, stills.
 The American poet Rosmarie Waldrop writes:
Vertigo. The terms shift. The relation of the terms shifts. The richness undermines itself. If 
everything is like something else, no one likeness means anything. . . . We are left with “pure” 
analogy, the gesture of it rather than any one specific analogy. A gesture that makes the 
terms transparent for the very structure of language, of signification. . . .
Transparency for the structure of signification—and for its limits: the silence, the infinite, the 
nothing, all it is not able to hold.55
Beckett himself closes “neither” with a similar, though also perhaps more hoveringly 
indirect, principle:
unheard footfalls only sound
till at last halt for good, absent for good from self and other
then no sound
then gently light unfading on that unheeded neither
unspeakable home56
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In a sense, the closing “unspeakable home” arguably says both too much and not enough. 
The disproportion between the unspeakable and the specificity of home marks out the 
question of how to get from “silence” to “resting place,” highlighting less the hesitancy 
of home than the inability to remain still, silent, the rift of the look that turns back and 
stares and sounds. In doing so, Beckett precipitates the course of the world within the 
folds of what escapes, of what emerges, of what the semantic layerings of the words still 
and neither translate. As Feldman put it in an interview about his opera Neither, “the 
subject . . . essentially is to do with whether you’re in the shadows of understanding 
or non-understanding. Finally you’re in the shadows. You’re not going to arrive at any 
understanding at all; you’re just left there holding this hot potato which is life.”57
 Here myriad displacements are not to be explained but encountered rather as fathom, 
literally, as in “something which embraces” what falls through the cracks. As in Levi-
nas’s phrase: “A voice comes from the other shore. A voice interrupts the saying of the 
already said.”58
———
In the early Dream of Fair to Middling Women Belacqua passes comment on the “inco-
herent continuum” he sees explored by Rimbaud, Hölderlin, and especially the later 
Beethoven, specifically in relation to the nothing and the incoherence that lurks behind 
language and all empirical systems.59 In Belacqua’s estimation, Beethoven’s art is “a bliz-
zard of electrons; and then vespertine compositions eaten away with terrible silences.”60 
Or as Beckett writes to Axel Kaun, “the sound surface of Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony 
is devoured by huge black pauses, so that . . . we cannot perceive it as other than a diz-
zying path of sounds connecting unfathomable chasms of silence.”61 “Of course, for the 
time being,” Beckett continues, “one makes do with little. At first, it can only be a matter 
of somehow inventing a method of verbally demonstrating this scornful attitude vis-à-
vis the word. In this dissonance of instrument and usage perhaps one will already be able 
to sense a whispering of the end-music or of the silence underlying all.”62
 The concern of quantum physics is also a concern with first principles. Indeed, from 
this perspective the range of Beckett’s works that might be said to reflect, whether 
directly or indirectly, the same concerns in terms of poetics might include the calcified 
voice of the poems in Echo’s Bones, the third zone of Murphy’s mind, Lucky’s soliloquy 
in Waiting for Godot, the unimaginable zero toward which Endgame appears inevitably 
to steer, the grammatical disjunctions and ellipses of Not I, the simultaneously self-pro-
pelling and self-annihilating syntax of The Unnamable, the non-assemblage fragments in 
How It Is, the mathematically precise and overdetermined spatial precision of The Lost 
Ones, Quad, and All Strange Away, the reverberating landscape of “Still,” and the non-
representational landscape of Worstward Ho with its recourse to notational “blanks” 
and, ultimately, dashes.
 Worstward Ho is a particularly striking and apposite example here. Ruud Hisgen 
and Adriaan van der Weel suggest that Worstward Ho might be read as “an exercise in 
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establishing to what extent it is possible to disconnect the representational ties that bind 
language to our shared knowledge of the world.”63 Ackerley and Gontarski have noted 
that “the closer to emptying the void, of man, boy, woman, skull, the closer void comes 
to an entity imagined in language. The desire to worsen language and its images gener-
ates an expansion of imaginative activity in its attempt to order experience.”64 Similarly, 
although frequency remains constant, when a beam of light enters another object its 
speed and wavelength change and more and more this has less to do with knowing than 
with feeling. A wavelength is the distance between repetitions of a shape such as a body 
and may be measured by observing the distance between consecutive corresponding 
points of the same phase, including crests, troughs, zero crossings. A phase is the pro-
portion of a wave cycle that has taken place in relation to a fixed point. If two waves of 
the same length and frequency are in phase, both the wave crests and wave troughs align. 
This is called constructive interference and results in a brightening of the waveform in 
that location.
 The notion of quantum decoherence remarks the loss of coherence in a system. 
H. Dieter Zeh comments that “The essence of decoherence is thus given by the perma-
nent and uncontrollable increase of entanglement between all systems. It describes the 
realistic situation of our world, which is very far from equilibrium, and it thus leads to 
the permanent dislocalization of superpositions. Its time arrow is formally analogous to 
the creation of ‘irrelevant’ statistical correlations by Boltzmann collisions. Neglecting 
these classical correlations . . . would lead to an increase of ensemble entropy.”65
 The composer Daniel Wolf’s discussion of his own score called Decoherence is illus-
trative of what is at stake here. It is, he writes, “an attempt to make counterpoint from 
an alternative premise or metaphor. Instead of this against that the idea here is that 
same becomes different through a loss of cohesion, a coming apart. This can be gradual 
(through accumulated errors, for example) or sudden.”66
———
Across Beckett’s work in general, language slips. His writing, that is to say, screens a 
spacing of movement that, like the incoherent continuum, excepts analogy, metaphor, 
that turns inside out the common structures of reference and designation and leaves 
them hanging. N. Santilli notes how “the loss of prepositions and punctuation marks 
serve to invite a reasoning rather than a reading of the text, despite the fact that the 
result may be more ‘atomistic’ than associative.”67 H. Porter Abbott labels such sites in 
Beckett “egregious gaps.” For Abbott, these gaps are essentially what might be termed a 
“felt empiricism,” a loose, idiosyncratic version, perhaps of Berkeley’s notion of empiri-
cal signification. As Abbott comments, “this art of the egregious gap has less to do with 
signifying nothing there than nothing known—less to do with nothingness as an actual 
void, empirical or metaphysical, than with creating a felt conviction of the inability to 
know whether there is an actual void out there or something else, of whatever degree of 
strangeness.”68 In “Still” the disproportion between the unspeakable and the specificity 
Against Metaphor >> Nikolai Duffy 49
of textual notation marks out the question of how to get from “silence” to “resting place,” 
highlighting less the hesitancy of description than the inability to remain still, silent, the 
rift of the look that turns back and stares and sounds. In doing so, Beckett precipitates 
the course of the world within the folds of what escapes, of what emerges. 
———
According to the seventeenth-century Jesuit priest, mathematician, and physicist Fran-
cesco Maria Grimaldi, diffraction is the bending of waves around obstacles and the 
spreading out of waves past small openings. The effects of diffraction are most definite 
where the wavelength is of a similar size to the diffracting object. Small particles in the 
air can cause a bright ring to be visible around a bright light source such as the sun or 
a halogen lamp. The word “diffraction” comes from the Latin diffringere, meaning “to 
break into pieces.”
———
In 1955 Blanchot observed that “to write is to make oneself the echo of what cannot cease 
speaking—and since it cannot, in order to become its echo I have, in a way, to silence 
it. . . . This silence has its source in the effacement toward which the writer is drawn.”69
———
At the center of the French poet Claude Royet-Journoud’s first book, Le renversement, 
is a page which, in its entirety, reads “échapperons-nous à l’analogie” (shall we escape 
analogy).70 There is no question mark and the rest of the page is blank. In many respects, 
this line is tantamount to a characteristically oblique statement by Royet-Journoud on 
the underlying principle of his own poetics. Royet-Journoud’s starting point here is a 
reaction against surrealism and what he perceives to be its compositional overreliance 
on juxtaposition, associative imagery and, crucially, metaphor. It has been against such 
compositional methods that, since the 1960s, Royet-Journoud has attempted to develop 
what is often termed a “literal” practice. In part, Royet-Journoud has attempted to 
develop such a practice by effacing his writing until the published works come to resem-
ble something like minimalism: the white of the page is everywhere and is part of both 
the poem’s form and content; but Royet-Journoud has also developed a poetic—similar 
to that of Louis Zukofsky but also to the very late Beckett works such as Worstward Ho or 
“What is the Word”—that relies heavily on the repeated use of the preposition as poetic 
anchor and foil to language’s propensity to combine and sprawl. A preposition, in other 
words, is not sense itself but a companion to sense. Here “companion” should be under-
stood only in its nautical sense, namely, as a window frame through which light passes to 
a lower cabin, and back again. It is the place of foreignness and the foreignness of place. 
Taking Beckett’s example as an initial starting point, Royet-Journoud’s work stands out 
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most in its attempt to establish a literary form that shows chaos, all the attendant mess, 
the come and go of things, more as they are than as they appear.
 In an interview Royet-Journoud puts it in the following terms: “my work points to the 
imperceptible. . . . I play on minimal units of meaning. . . . The other constraint, perhaps 
more delicate in nature, is the avoidance of assonance, alliteration, metaphor: everything 
that usually represents struggle within a poem. . . . For me what is interesting is the literal 
and not the metaphoric.”71 Royet-Journoud goes on to develop this elsewhere, comment-
ing how, “For me, Eluard’s verse ‘The earth is blue like an orange’ can be exhausted, it 
annihilates itself in an excess of meaning. Whereas Marcelin Pleynet’s ‘the far wall is a 
whitewashed wall’ is and remains, by its very exactness, and evidently within its context, 
paradoxically indeterminate as to meaning and so will always ‘vehiculate’ narrative.”72
In her essay on the poetics of Claude Royet-Journoud and Anne-Marie Albiach, “Shall We 
Escape Analogy,” Waldrop writes that “for the long stretch from Romanticism through 
Modernism, poetry has been more or less identified with metaphor, with relation by 
analogy. In linguistic terms, this has been an emphasis on the vertical axis of the speech 
act: the axis of selection, of reference to the code with its vertical substitution-sets of 
elements linked by similarity, rather than on the horizontal axis of combination, context, 
contiguity, syntax, and metonymy.”73 In Fred Orton’s terms, metonymy “is based on a 
proposed continuous or sequential link between the literal object and its replacement 
by association or reference.” Crucially, metonymy is “the record of a lacuna, of a move or 
displacement from cause to effect, container to contained.” In other words, metonymy 
“represents not the object or thing or event or feeling which is its referent but that which 
is tied to it by contingent or associative transfers of meaning.”74
 In her 1977 essay, “Charles Olson: Process and Relationship,” Waldrop quotes both 
Charles Olson and Ernest Fenollosa on the inseparability of things. In his essay “The 
Escaped Cock,” Charles Olson writes that, “at root (or stump) what is, is no longer 
THINGS but what happens BETWEEN things.”75 Similarly, Fenollosa writes the follow-
ing lines in Notes on the Chinese Written Character (lines which, Waldrop notes, Olson 
underlined in his copy of the book): “A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist in 
nature. Things are only the terminal points, or rather the meeting points of actions, 
cross-sections cut through actions, snap-shots. . . . Thing and action are not formally sep-
arated.”76 And as Waldrop goes on to gloss in what can equally be read as an early state-
ment of her own developing poetic principle: “what matters is what happens between 
things, between words. You cannot separate things and actions, you cannot separate an 
occasion into its discrete components.”77
 Yet nor can those components be conflated or rendered the same. Olson may well 
famously maintain that “ONE PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY 
LEAD TO A FURTHER PERCEPTION” but from there it does not necessarily follow 
that sequential movement is orchestrated by a pattern of cause and effect.78 For Olson, as 
for Waldrop, rather, any sequence is contiguous, discrete, non-associative. It is so, Wal-
drop suggests, because here “the direction is outward and physical, toward perceptions 
rather than ideas.” Further, “such a movement has no ‘organic’ closure, that it could go 
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on forever, that it is is definitely ‘open.’ Even the balance of forces which tells writer and 
reader that the poem is finished is temporary. On contact with, in the neighborhood of, 
another poem the balance proves to have vectors toward yet further perceptions.”79 
 In many ways, this suspicion of equivalence can be understood as a suspicion of knowl-
edge, or more properly, a suspicion of claims to knowledge. In a letter to Cid Corman, 
Olson writes, “a man can only express that which he knows. Now the further difficulty 
is, we think we know. And that too is a mare’s nest: we don’t even know until we bend to 
the modesty to say we have nothing to say.”80 Indeed, in Olson’s language, equivalence is 
a closed field. Rather than necessarily illuminating the world, however, contiguity caters 
for doubt: as a relation between terms it makes no totalizing claim. In Being Singular 
Plural Nancy develops this sense of contiguity, arguing that contiguity establishes a 
discrete chain of singularities which are non-continuous with one another. “From one 
singular to another,” Nancy writes, “there is contiguity but not continuity. There is prox-
imity, but only to the extent that extreme closeness emphasizes the distancing it opens 
up.” Nancy then goes on to develop this argument by suggesting the ways in which the 
proximity yet non-equivalence of singular contiguities corresponds to the space of the 
between: the between has “neither a consistency nor continuity of its own. It does not 
lead from one to the other; it constitutes no connective tissue, no cement, no bridge.”81 
Rather, it is analogous to the “strands whose extremities remain separate even at the 
very center of the knot. . . . The ‘between’ is the stretching out and distance opened by 
the singular as such, as its spacing of meaning.”82 
 Beckett on Joyce: “Here form is content, content is form. You complain that this stuff 
is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read—or rather it is not only 
to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not about something, it is 
that something itself.”83
 Hugo von Hofmannsthal: “We must hide what is deep. Where? On the surface.”84 
———
Samuel Beckett: “Before the door that opens on my story, that will surprise me, if it 
opens, it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am.”85 
 Jacques Lacan: “There is no speech without a reply, even if it is met only with silence.”86
 Gilles Deleuze: “When a language is so strained that it starts to stutter, or to mur-
mur or stammer . . . then language in its entirety reaches the limit that marks its outside 
and makes it confront silence. When a language is strained in this way, language in its 
entirety is submitted to a pressure that makes it fall silent.”87
———
In line with its root in the Greek ekstasis, meaning “standing outside,” in Being and Time 
Heidegger connects the ecstatic with existence. As ek-static, in other words, the one who 
lives is neither for-itself nor in-itself but “ “‘outside-of-itself ’ in and for itself.”88 “Ecstases,” 
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Heidegger comments in the section in Being and Time called “The Temporal Problem of 
the Transcendence of the World,” “are not simply raptures in which one gets carried 
away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a ‘whither’ to which one is carried away.”89 
———
Language, like any field at once constitutive and unknown, “comes to us from the fur-
thest reaches, through the immense rumbling of a music destroyed, coming, perhaps 
deceptively, as also the beginning of all music. Something, sovereignty itself, disappears 
here, appears here, without our being able to decide between apparition and disappear-
ance, or to decide between fear and hope, desire and death, the end and the beginning of 
time, between the truth of the return and the madness of the return.”90 
 Susan Howe: “Pulling pieces of geometry, geology, alchemy, philosophy, politics, biog-
raphy, biology, mythology, and philology from alien territory, a . . . woman audaciously 
invented a new grammar grounded in humility and hesitation. HESITATE from the 
Latin, meaning to stick. Stammer. To hold back in doubt, have difficulty speaking.”91
———
Recovering in the Hôpital Pasteur from a suspected stroke in July 1988, Beckett began 
to compose his final work, “Comment dire.” As Laura Salisbury notes, the work is “scat-
tered with stuttered dashes, abrupt elisions, compulsive repetitions and controlled 
echoes that inhabit an uncanny hinterland between the voluntary and the involuntary.”92
what –
what is the word –
seeing all this –
all this this –
all this this here –
folly for to see what –
glimpse –
seem to glimpse –
need to seem to glimpse –
afaint afar away over there what –
folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what –
what –
what is the word –93
———
“There was something like a word that could not be pronounced, even when one suc-
ceeded in saying it and perhaps precisely because one had, at every instant, and as if 
there were not enough instants for the purpose, to say it, to think it.”94
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